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Previous  research  on academic  entrepreneurship  and  engagement  with  industry  has  found  that  the
behaviour  of  academics  is inﬂuenced  by  their local  social  context.  However,  we  know  little  about  the
mechanisms  that  produce  this  effect.  We  argue  that  academic  scientists’  industry  engagement  is inﬂu-
enced  signiﬁcantly  by the  behaviour  of  their  peers,  that  is, the  behaviour  of  colleagues  of  similar  seniority.
Using  insights  from  social psychology,  we  hypothesize  that these  peer  effects  are  produced  by the  mech-
anism  of  social  comparison.  In an  analysis  of  data  from  multiple  sources  for 1370  UK  academic  scientistseywords:
niversity–industry relations
cademic engagement
ommercialization
cientists
eer effects
and  engineers,  we  ﬁnd  that  peer  effects  are  stronger  for early  career  individuals  and  weaker  for star
scientists,  suggesting  the  incidence  of  social  comparison.  We  argue that  individuals  look  to  their imme-
diate peers  for inspiration,  because  they  view  them  as an  important  reference  group  and  use  them  as  a
benchmark  for  their  own  ambitions  and behaviours.  Our  ﬁndings  have  important  implications  for how
universities  may  encourage  scientists’  behaviours  by paying  attention  to local  work  contexts.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license. Introduction
There is broad agreement that interactions between public
cience and industry contribute signiﬁcantly to innovation in prod-
cts, processes and services (Mansﬁeld, 1991; Cohen et al., 2002;
urray, 2002). It is also true that there can be simultaneous ben-
ﬁts for academic science from interactions with industry since
any academics work in more applied ﬁelds, such as medicine
nd engineering (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1994), and industry prob-
ems traditionally have served as a powerful stimulus for progress
n both basic and applied science (Rosenberg, 1982; Stokes, 1997).
hese interactions can take many forms from collaborative research
o more direct commercial activities such as the founding of uni-
ersity spin-out ﬁrms (Louis et al., 1989; Agrawal and Henderson,
002; D’Este and Patel, 2007).
While academic scientists have long participated in practi-
al problem-solving (Geuna and Muscio, 2009; Mowery, 2009),
ince the early 1980s the emergence of novel technologi-
al opportunities, for example, in biotechnology or computer
cience, have renewed interest in the conditions that facil-
tate university–industry interaction (Mowery et al., 2001).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +45 3815 3965.
E-mail address: vt.ino@cbs.dk (V. Tartari).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.02.003
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Governments increasingly view universities as ‘engines of eco-
nomic growth’ (Feller, 1990), and universities are keen to
acquire resources via commercialization and industry collabora-
tion, prompting researchers to investigate what drives individual
academic researchers to cooperate with industry. Many authors
have investigated the role played by individual characteristics and
organizational factors such as the attributes of universities (Di
Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Lockett and Wright, 2005).
A smaller, but growing body of research considers how the local
social context in which academics operate inﬂuences their propen-
sity to engage with industry and to commercialize their research
(Louis et al., 1989; Stuart and Ding, 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman,
2008). This line of work suggests that individual academics and
their achievements are highly inﬂuenced by the attitudes and
behaviours of their work colleagues, the prevailing local norms,
and the local leaders. In other words, academics often emulate their
colleagues’ behaviours; parallel evidence exists on entrepreneurial
behaviour, indicating that an individual’s immediate work col-
leagues exert considerable inﬂuence on the individual’s propensity
to found a ﬁrm (Nanda and Sorensen, 2010).
However, despite the insights from previous work, we still
know little about why individual academics behave in similar ways
to their local colleagues. For instance, we  are yet to understand
whether local effects emanate from a common culture or norms,
collective learning and imitation, or hierarchical imposition of
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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olicies. In this paper, we argue that peer effects play a key role in
haping academics’ behaviours. We  explore how peer effects shape
ndividuals’ academic engagement, which encompasses the various
ays that academic scientists collaborate with third-party orga-
izations, and includes collaborative research, contract research
nd consulting as well as informal networking with practitioners
Perkmann et al., 2013). Academic engagement involves a large
roportion of academic scientists across many disciplines, gener-
tes income for universities and may  result in commercialization
xtending to licensing of patents and spin-out activities (Perkmann
t al., 2013). Given the relevance of academics’ engagement with
ndustry for innovation and problem-solving (Cohen et al., 2002),
t is important to develop a detailed understanding of what drives
cientists’ collaboration.
We argue that the inﬂuence of the local environment on aca-
emic scientists is in the form of peer effects, manifested by
mulation of the behaviours of colleagues of the same rank. Using
nsights from social psychology, we argue also that these peer
ffects are largely underpinned by the tendency for individual
cademics’ to compare themselves with other individuals. Social
omparison involves individuals choosing a reference group to use
s a yardstick to measure their own ambitions and behaviours
Hyman, 1942; Ibarra and Andrews, 1993). The incidence of social
omparison suggests the presence of some degree of intradepart-
ental rivalry, as individuals compare themselves with similarly
anked colleagues in order to advance their careers in competitive
rofessional environments.
We  develop hypotheses to investigate the idea that peer effects
re generated by social comparison dynamics, and test them using
ata from multiple sources on 1371 UK academic scientists in a
ange of universities and disciplines. We  pay particular attention
o the so-called ‘reﬂection problem’ which often affects economet-
ic studies of peer effects and can result in spurious correlations
Manski, 1993). The reﬂection problem refers to the overstating
f the incidence of peer effects in studies proposing that individual
ehaviour is explained by the average behaviour of a group (Manski,
993). We  perform several tests to rule out possible alternative
xplanations for real endogenous peer effects.
Our study highlights the extent to which academic engagement
s shaped by the behaviour of the focal individuals’ peers. We  try
o both identify the nature of this local social inﬂuence and partly
xclude a variety of other mechanisms that might be responsible
or generating behavioural alignment in local work contexts. We
uggest that individuals look to their immediate peers for inspi-
ation, predominantly because they view these individuals as an
mportant reference group; they ‘benchmark’ their own  ambitions
nd behaviours against those of their similarly ranked peers. At
he same time, we note the absence of effects exerted by local
ocial norms in informing individuals’ engagement behaviours, as
mplied by some previous research (Louis et al., 1989; Haeussler
nd Colyvas, 2011). Our ﬁndings have important implications for
he way speciﬁc behaviours, related to engagement of academics
n local work contexts, might be promoted by universities.
. Theoretical background
Academia is unique in allowing individuals to engage proac-
ively in a wide range of diverse activities from start-up
ntrepreneur, to government advisor and other civil society roles.
hief amongst the work areas where academics have consider-
ble discretion is collaboration with industry partners. This type of
ctivity requires initiative on the part of the academic to approach
nd develop relations with industry partners, going beyond the
onventions of academia related to teaching obligations. How-
ver, in many universities, academics’ engagement with industryy 43 (2014) 1189–1203
is less valuable for career progression than publications and other
research-related outputs. So what drives individuals to engage with
industry?
Previous work focuses primarily on personal attributes to
explain the propensity to engage with industry, that is, on individ-
ual scientiﬁc productivity, demographic attributes, social capital,
experience and professional status (Louis et al., 1989; D’Este and
Patel, 2007; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008; Boardman and
Ponomariov, 2009; Giuliani et al., 2010; D’Este and Perkmann,
2011; Haeussler and Colyvas, 2011). This research is complemented
by studies exploring the role of organizational structures and other
attributes including the features of specialized technology transfer
units, and university or department research quality (Bozeman and
Gaughan, 2007; D’Este and Patel, 2007; Ponomariov, 2008).
Some studies of the determinants of academic scientists’ par-
ticipation in commercialization have found that the social context
in which individuals are embedded is an important explanatory
factor. Using a sample of US-based life scientists, Stuart and Ding
(2006) ﬁnd that the greater the involvement of university and
department colleagues and co-authors in private sector ﬁrms, the
more likely an individual academic will be an entrepreneur. Being
embedded in an academic department with a culture that is sup-
portive of entrepreneurial activities can help to counteract the
disincentives created by a university environment that does not
reward such efforts (Kenney and Goe, 2004). A qualitative study on
university patenting by Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) illustrates
how the prestige associated with successful commercialization
affects the aspirations of individuals. Those engaging in success-
ful commercialization can become role models, providing powerful
inspiration to work colleagues (Kassicieh et al., 1996; Wright et al.,
2004). Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) conﬁrm the existence of such
peer effects in their study of medical researchers; they ﬁnd that
individuals are more likely to disclose inventions if departmen-
tal colleagues of similar seniority had done so. Also, Giuliani et al.
(2010) show in the context of wine research in Chile, South Africa
and Italy that the number of industry contacts in the networks of
departmental colleagues was positively associated with the scope
of an individual’s personal network of industry contacts.
Thus, the emphasis has shifted from individual characteristics
and organizational structures to consideration of how the local
social environment can stimulate proactive behaviour among aca-
demics. While one may  suspect that similar considerations may
hold for greater participation in the traditional missions of the uni-
versity sector, very few studies have addressed this question. Louis
et al. (1989) found that local norms were more powerful predictors
of various types of engagement than individual characteristics and
Aschhoff and Grimpe (2014), using publications data, show that the
publishing behaviours of both departmental colleagues and aca-
demic co-authors’ shape researchers’ academic engagement with
industry, with this effect being more pronounced in the earlier
stages of their academic careers.
While this emerging body of work suggests that scientists’ social
environments play an important role in shaping their discretionary
activities, it does not point to the speciﬁc mechanisms that gener-
ate this effect. In this paper, we  develop a theory that emphasizes
the role of peers. A peer group is a speciﬁc type of reference group,
which the individual takes account of when selecting a behaviour
amongst several alternatives (Hyman, 1942; Kemper, 1968). An
individual’s peers are deﬁned as those individuals in the imme-
diate social context of similar rank and similar attributes to the
focal individual. The inﬂuence of peers on individual behaviour has
been documented in many different empirical settings, including
neighbourhoods (Dietz, 2002), education (Coleman, 1966; Jackson
and Bruegmann, 2009), movie sales (Moretti, 2011), health plan
choices (Sorensen, 2006), and workplace contexts (Lazega, 2000;
Nanda and Sorensen, 2010).
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. Hypothesis development
We  consider departmental colleagues of similar rank as the
alient peer group for the academic’s work-related behaviour.
he department is a central organizational feature of academic
ife and is constituted by the immediate community of work
olleagues. Although departments may  be composed of smaller
nits, ‘the department’ is the principal locus of decision-making
n academia (Alpert, 1985). Working in a department imposes
bligations and responsibilities on academic staff, such as sharing
eaching workloads and participating in departmental committees.
iring, promotion and applications for tenure are normally decided
rst at department level before consideration by the university.
ithin the same university, departments may  differ about expec-
ations related to scholarship, organizational citizenship behaviour
nd attitudes to commercialization.
In developing our hypotheses for how the departmental con-
ext can shape individual academics’ engagement with industry,
e draw on social psychology - speciﬁcally, social comparison the-
ry (Festinger, 1954; Tafjel, 1981; Wills, 1981). Social comparison
heory postulates that individuals have an intrinsic tendency to
elf-evaluate, and that such self-evaluation is often informed by
omparison with others (Festinger, 1954). In drawing on others’
bilities and achievements, self-evaluation becomes a driver of imi-
ative behaviour. Emulating others’ actions allows individuals not
nly to reduce perceived discrepancy between themselves and oth-
rs, but also improves their conception of themselves by seeking to
o better (Festinger, 1954). Since not everyone can outdo his or her
eers, the state of equilibrium is elusive and competition ensues.
ence, both social inﬂuence and competitive behaviour derive from
he same socio-psychological process, that is, social comparison
Festinger, 1954).
If we consider the characteristics of academia as a profes-
ional system in which individuals work and build their careers, its
ompetitive nature is evident. Although science relies strongly on
ollaboration within and across laboratories (Adams et al., 2005),
t is also a system in which individuals compete for status and
esources. The principle of priority means that the beneﬁts from
 discovery accrue almost exclusively to the scientist who ﬁrst
ublished it (Merton, 1973). Thus, scientists compete to be the
rst to report a discovery, and receive status and resources on this
asis (Whitley, 2000). This competitive process is played out within
cientiﬁc communities, which are stratiﬁed social systems where
igh-status individuals gain disproportionate beneﬁts compared to
he other participants (Zuckerman, 1970; Cole and Cole, 1974). The
opulation of universities as the employers of academics is itself
ighly stratiﬁed, with the most prestigious institutions continu-
usly capturing a disproportionate share of government grants and
ndustry contracts (Jones et al., 2008). The stratiﬁcation of the sci-
nce system implies that there are major professional gains from a
igh-status position and, hence, that scientists have a strong incen-
ive to compete for the most senior positions (Stephan, 1996).
Competition in science is manifested in various ways. Because
any scientists have suffered from someone else being the ﬁrst to
ublish their scientiﬁc discovery, they resort to secrecy and with-
olding of information from others in the community (Hagstrom,
974; Blumenthal et al., 1996). In addition, as the membership
f scientiﬁc teams increases, there is intense competition over
rst authorship on joint scientiﬁc publications (Knorr-Cetina and
arré, 1981). Cases of scientiﬁc misconduct are illustrative of
he desirability of the rewards that the science system offers to
hose who achieve prominence (Furman et al., 2012). Especially
rom the 1980s onwards, opportunities for academic entrepreneur-
hip and academic engagement–and hence impliclity for ﬁnancial
ain–have become an additional area of competition for scien-
iﬁc colleagues (Stephan and Everhart, 1998). At the same time,y 43 (2014) 1189–1203 1191
ﬁscal budgetary constraints have forced policy makers in many
countries to encourage universities to move towards more com-
petitive sources of funding (Geuna and Nesta, 2006), which results
in academics competing for funding in a resource-constrained envi-
ronment.
If one agrees that competition in science at least partly arises
from the need for of individuals to compare themselves with rel-
evant others, one needs to deﬁne the reference group for this
comparison. A reference group is the group of people that indi-
viduals elect as a benchmark for their ambitions and to measure
their progress (Merton and Kitt, 1950; Ibarra and Andrews, 1993;
Guryan et al., 2007). Individuals tend to compare themselves with
others whom they consider as having similar attitudes or abil-
ities, and ignore those who  deviate markedly from themselves
(Festinger, 1954). Thus, the peer group is an important reference
group of closely proximate individuals of similar rank, within the
wider social context. Peer group members are likely to have simi-
lar abilities and achievement records and, hence, provide a realistic
yardstick for self-evaluation. The peer group acts as a standard or
checkpoint that can be used to evaluate a situation and, particularly,
the individual’s position in it (Zimmerman, 2003; Mas  and Moretti,
2009; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). Peer groups can be a yardstick
for ambition, based on the desire to relate to and be accepted by a
group (Shibutani, 1955). By implication, when deciding to engage
in speciﬁc behaviours, individuals will emulate the behaviours they
observe in their peer group.
If we apply these considerations to the subject of our study, this
means that junior faculty members will compare themselves with
departmental colleagues of similar rank rather than with senior col-
leagues with much higher achievement. Engagement with industry
is particularly likely to involve comparison with departmental
peers. On the one hand, comparison is particularly important in
relation to behaviours that are discretionary and not proscribed
by formal rules; when seeking engagement with industry which is
not governed by formal university rules, academics will be particu-
larly likely to look to their peers for clues about how to behave. On
the other hand, in seeking industry funding for personal research
projects or engaging in potentially lucrative consulting projects,
the outcomes are uncertain and comparative self-evaluation with
peers can be useful to build conﬁdence. Individuals observe their
colleagues and establish individual ambitions by emulating the
observed behaviour. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987;
Hogg and Abrams, 1988) suggests that uncertainty promotes in-
group identiﬁcation and makes the members of an individual’s peer
reference group the focus of social comparison. The above consid-
erations lead us to hypothesize that:
H1. The extent of an academic’s engagement with industry is
positively associated with the extent of their departmental peers’
industry engagement.
The hypothesis above states simply that in departments with
high average industry engagement, the focal individual will demon-
strate equally high levels of industry engagement, while in
departments with low average levels of engagement, individuals
will be deterred from engaging with industry. We  now consider
how the degree to which an individual is susceptible to peer effects
is moderated by personal characteristics. The direction of these
moderation effect will provide support for our basic hypothesis
that individuals’ industry engagement is, to a considerable degree,
driven by the mechanism of social comparison.
A characteristic likely to inﬂuence individuals’ propensity to
take behavioural cues from their work peers is their seniority in
the university. Professional competition for senior positions in aca-
demic science is ﬁerce, and success depends heavily on what the
individual achieves in the early stages of his or her career. Even
small differences in performance can result in large differences in
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rofessional pay-offs (Freeman et al., 2001). However, the salient
eference groups against which individuals evaluate themselves in
he face of the competition are likely to vary according to profes-
ional rank. It can be argued that the more junior the academic, the
ore likely the salient reference group will be represented by local
eers. Junior scientists are more concerned about career advance-
ent than their more senior colleagues (Baldwin and Blackburn,
981) and usually will work against locally deﬁned benchmarks
or promotion or tenure. When evaluating their performance,
herefore, comparison with local colleagues will be inevitable, par-
icularly in departmental situations where numerous individuals
re competing for a limited number of senior positions. On the other
and, more senior colleagues, apart from their already achieved
evel of professional security, operate within wider networks and
re likely to occupy pockets within their scientiﬁc communities.
n their quest for self-evaluation, they are less likely to look to
heir departmental peers. So, because junior scientists benchmark
hemselves against that group, they will be more likely emulate the
ctivities of local peers with regard to engagement with industry
hile for senior members we can expect a smaller effect of such
ocal inﬂuence.
2. The effect of an academic’s departmental peers on the extent
f his/her engagement with industry decreases with the individ-
al’s degree of seniority.
Next, we investigate how individual performance affects aca-
emics’ susceptibility to peer behaviour. It has been documented
hat a small group of highly effective researchers plays a dispropor-
ionate role within a scientiﬁc community in terms of productivity
Zucker and Darby, 1996). ‘Star’ scientists also outperform their
olleagues in terms of engagement in the commercialization of
esearch, and are responsible for a signiﬁcant share of universities’
conomic activities (Zucker and Darby, 1996).
High performance is closely correlated to status within the
cientiﬁc community. Over time, the status of ‘stars’ becomes self-
einforcing because reputation attracts larger ﬂows of resources,
nd provides higher visibility, resulting in more attention to the
esearch outputs of these individuals (Merton, 1968). It is unlikely
hat these overachieving scientists will choose their ‘average’
epartmental colleagues as a reference group for self-evaluation
nd comparison. Social comparison often involves the selective
earch for clues that conﬁrm the similarity of one’s peers to oneself
Mussweiler and Strack, 2000). For star scientists, ‘similar others’
re more likely to be represented by other stars in the scientiﬁc
ommunity than by departmental colleagues. In contrast, ‘average’
esearchers will prefer to compare themselves to equals within
heir academic departmental colleagues. Thus, lower performers
ill tend to follow the behaviour of departmental peers more than
tar performers - a further conﬁrmation of the presence of the
ocial comparison processes underpinning peer effects in academic
epartments. We  hypothesize that:
3. The effect of an academic’s departmental peers on the extent
f his/her engagement with industry decreases with the individ-
al’s scientiﬁc performance.
. Data and methodology
.1. Data
To explore our hypotheses, we exploited a unique dataset cover-
ng a population of 6200 academic researchers in the UK, compiled
rom various sources. These include information on this population
f scientists from the records of principal investigators and co-
nvestigators awarded grants from the UK Engineering and Physical
ciences Research Council (EPSRC) in the period 1992–2006. They 43 (2014) 1189–1203
EPSRC is the largest research funding body in the UK and in 2008
disbursed £740 m for research across all ﬁelds of engineering,
mathematics, chemistry and physics. The EPSRC encourages part-
nerships between researchers and third parties, such as private
ﬁrms, public bodies, non-proﬁt organizations, etc. However, for
most research projects, there is no requirement to have an indus-
trial partner. The selection of projects is based solely on peer review
by a panel of academic and non-academic reviewers. We  used
the EPSRC data to obtain information on each academic’s research
funding proﬁle, including amounts of funding received. This data is
comprehensive and covers all academics granted EPSRC funding in
the UK over a period of 15 years.
First, we  conducted an Internet-based survey of the 6200 aca-
demics listed in the EPSRC records, who were listed as active
academics on their respective university websites. The question-
naire covered various aspects of individuals’ academic engagement,
such as engagement type and frequency, and attitudes to engage-
ment. The survey instrument exploited items and scales deployed
in previous surveys of academics (Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007;
D’Este and Patel, 2007; Link et al., 2007) and included several ques-
tions exploring individual attitudes to industry engagement and
entrepreneurship. A draft version of the questionnaire was  piloted
with 30 academics at a research-intensive university. The ﬁnal
questionnaire was  administered to the whole population between
April and September 2009 with a cover letter signed by the Chief
Executive Ofﬁcer of the EPSRC, followed a few days later by an
email containing a personalized link to access the survey. Non-
respondents were followed-up by two  further email messages and
where necessary two  telephone reminders. We  obtained a total of
2194 completed questionnaires, corresponding to a response rate
of 36%.
Second, we drew on data collected from a survey administered
to the same population in 2004 (D’Este and Patel, 2007) which also
asked about frequency of engagement with industry; 735 individ-
uals responded to both waves of the survey.
Third, we  matched our sample with the population of aca-
demics included in the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)
(HEFCE, 2008b). The RAE was  a government-mandated programme
to assess the research quality of all higher education institutions
in the UK; for simplicity we refer to them below as ‘universities’.
The assessment was carried out via disciplinary panel reviews of
each department’s publication output, research environment and
research ranking. The results were used to determine the alloca-
tion of research funding in subsequent years to universities. RAE
submissions contain information on ‘units of assessment’, usually
departments or similar units, including their size and the amount
and nature of funding received in each of the previous seven years.
We used this information to develop measures of the departmental
environment for each individual in our sample.
Fourth, we matched the universities included in our sample with
data derived from the government’s Higher Education-Business
and Community Interaction Survey (HE-BCI) conducted in 2008,
covering the years 2005–2007 (HEFCE, 2008a). This annual manda-
tory survey records university level ﬁnancial and output data on a
range of knowledge exchange activities, from commercialization,
delivery of professional training, consultancy, contract research
and services, to community-oriented activities.
Fifth, to capture details on respondents’ scientiﬁc performance,
we collected bibliographic information from ISI Web  of Science,
including number of an individual’s journal articles, number of
citations, names of the journals, and associated disciplines.
Our ﬁnal data source was EUROSTAT (2003), which provides
information on the university region (NUTS2 level), including
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), business expenditure on Research
and Development (R&D), and patent applications. This data pro-
vides information on the regional economic context in which the
V. Tartari et al. / Research Policy 43 (2014) 1189–1203 1193
Table  1
Types of academic engagement.
Type of interaction (j) Frequency % (bj = 1) Broad engagement type
Attendance at conferences with industry and university 82.7 Networking
Attendance at industry sponsored meetings 63.6 Networking
A new contract research agreement 58.0 Research service
A  new joint research agreement 57.5 Joint research
Postgraduate training with a company 47.7 Training collaboration
47.6 Research service
30.4 Training collaboration
17.3 Joint research
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Table 2
Coding of occurrences of individuals’ engagement.A  new consultancy agreement 
Training of company employees 
Creation of new physical facilities with industry funding 
cademics operate; some local environments offer greater oppor-
unities than others for academic engagement.
We  performed several checks on the sample used for the anal-
sis to ensure its representativeness for our population. First, to
heck the reliability of our survey response pool, we conducted
ome tests on the response population, looking for sources of bias
n our sample. In particular, we analysed whether there were dif-
erences between respondents and non-respondents according to
tatus and type of their university afﬁliation. We  performed a
ilcoxon-Mann–Whitney test and found no signiﬁcant difference.
econd, because only grant holders were targeted, there was a risk
f sample selection bias since non-grant holders might behave dif-
erently in terms of engagement with industry. Since we  did not
ave information on academics that had not received a grant in the
eriod 1992 to 2006, as a proxy for non-grant holders we  used the
roup of academics in our survey that had not received a grant in
he years 2000 to 2006. We  compared their level of involvement
ith industry with that of academics who had received a grant in
000–2006 and found no statistically signiﬁcant differences across
ur key dependent and independent variables. Third, we performed
hecks on the characteristics of early vs late respondents and found
o major differences between the two populations1.
.1.1. Dependent variables
Our main dependent variable captures academics’ industry
ngagement behaviour through the construction of an index. The
cademic engagement index is a modiﬁed version of an index devel-
ped by Bozeman and Gaughan (2007). We  used information from
ur survey data on types and frequencies of academics’ engagement
o construct the index (see Table 1). These items cover a broader
ange of academic engagement forms than captured in previous
tudies of peer effects in academic contexts and, hence, provide a
omprehensive picture of individuals’ activities.
The index was constructed as follows. First, for every type of
ngagement we established whether the researcher had engaged
r not (‘occurrence’, denoted by bj); see Table 2 for the coding of
esponse items. We  computed the frequency of academics’ use of
ach type of engagement for the whole population in the following
ay:
j =
∑N
n=1bn,j
N
(1)
here j is the type of industry engagement, n is the individual
nd N is the total sample after matching the different databases
N = 1895). We  then constructed the academic engagement index
y multiplying the number of times each academic had used each
1 This paper builds on a wider research project, which includes the following
apers: Clarysse, Tartari, Salter, 2011; Tartari, Salter, D’Este, 2012; Tartari and Salter,
013.Questionnaire answer (category) 0 1–2 3–5 6–9 >10
Occurrence (bj) 0 1 1 1 1
Volume of interaction (Tj) 0 1.5 4 7.5 10
type of engagement (Tj) and the frequency of its non-occurrence
(1 − fj), and summed the scores.
IIIn =
8∑
j=1
Tj(1 − fj) (2)
By considering the frequency with which each type of inter-
action is used in the overall population, the index takes account
of the ‘difﬁculty’ of certain activities such as the creation of new
physical facilities relative to others such as attending industry
sponsored meetings. We  extend the measure proposed by Bozeman
and Gaughan (2007), using ﬁner grained information that takes
account of the actual number of occurrences of different types of
engagement for every individual, as opposed only to occurrence.
In addition, to probe possible differences between the different
kinds of engagement subsumed in the index, we created four vari-
ables representing four broad types of engagement: joint research,
training collaboration, research services, and networking. The value
for each of these broad types is represented by the average of the
academics’ use of two types of engagement with industry. Table 1
indicates the two subcomponents of each broad type.
4.1.2. Independent variables
Our main independent variable is departmental peers’ industry
engagement. Following Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), we deﬁne
a peer as a departmental colleague of the same academic rank as
the individual. We  assume that among senior faculty members (e.g.
professors), the decision to collaborate with industry will likely be
inﬂuenced by the actions of their academic equals in the faculty.
To avoid confounding effects deriving from authority-based rela-
tionships, we consider relationships only among similarly ranked
individuals.
Our main independent variable peers’ engagement is the average
academic engagement of the individual’s peers (excluding the focal
individual). It is constructed based on data taken from our survey
matched with departmental afﬁliation according to the RAE unit
of assessment. A meaningful measure of peer behaviour requires
information on at least one other researcher in addition to the focal
individual. We excluded individuals with no data on peers, which
left 1371 valid observations. The average cohort size in a depart-
ment is 11 individuals, which is reassurance that our results are
not driven by the behaviours of single researchers in small depart-
ments.
To explore the social comparison mechanisms inherent in peer
effects, we interacted the main independent variable with the
individual’s academic age or number of years of experience as an
academic, deﬁned as the individual’s present age minus age at PhD
award. We  interacted peers’ engagement with a dummy  variable for
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tar scientists. In line with the literature on star scientists (Zucker
nd Darby, 1996, 2001; Azoulay et al., 2008), we deﬁne star scien-
ist as academics in our sample in the top 1% of the distribution of
itations in their discipline, and in the top 25% of the distribution
or grants received from the EPSRC.
.1.3. Control variables
We  include a range of control variables to account for individ-
al, department, university, and regional level effects on academic
ngagement with industry. To control for the academic’s individ-
al characteristics we included demographic characteristics such
s gender and academic rank (coded as a dummy  variable indicat-
ng professor status) (Link et al., 2007). We  also included number
f years of experience of working in the private sector (industry
xperience). We constructed dummy  variables for British doctoral
egree (British PhD) and a proxy for quality of the PhD award-
ng institution (elite PhD) based on inclusion in the Times Higher
ducation Supplement (2004) list of worldwide top universities.
e included a variable for intrinsic motivation for becoming an
cademic researcher based on a question in the NSF Survey of
octorate Holders about motivations related to research careers.
dherence to the traditional academic norms of openness might
nﬂuence scientists’ attitudes to collaboration. A study of 98 US pro-
essors conducted by Renault (2006) indicates that espousing the
alues of academic capitalism (as opposed to Mertonian values) is
 strong predictor of involvement with industry. In controlling for
otivation we partly address a potential sorting bias in our data
see below) because career motivations remains fairly stable over
ime and hence informs individuals’ preference for speciﬁc types
f work environments. The information for these control variables
as taken from survey responses.
We control for researcher’s quality and productivity. We  include
otal research funding received from the EPSRC in the period
000–2006, standardized by the average level of funding of other
esearchers in the same discipline (individual grants).  We  control for
esearcher’s scientiﬁc productivity in the same period (2000–2006)
ased on number of publications on the ISI Web  of Science identi-
ying the researcher as an author (publications). We  used a dummy
ariable to control for scientiﬁc discipline (basic discipline), identi-
ying the disciplines mathematics, chemistry, and physics.
We used a group of variables to department’s characteristics,
aken from RAE 2008 data. Department industry funds refer to the
epartments’ research income from industry in 2005–2007 per full
ime equivalent (FTE) staff. Although we were unable to observe
he formal rules governing a department’s industry collaboration,
he amount of funding received from private companies acts as
 proxy since we can expect that departments heavily funded by
ndustry will encourage their members to collaborate with indus-
ry. We control for department research quality measured as the
ercentage of staff rated ‘internationally leading’ and ‘international
xcellent’ according to the RAE. These measures help to capture the
pportunities for academic engagement afforded by the prestige
nd visibility of the individual’s department.
To capture university characteristics we control for institutional
nvolvement in commercialization and collaboration activities
ased on stock of university patents per FTE, and income from
ndustry per employee (university industry funds) in the period
005–2007. These variables measure the university’s level of com-
ercialization efforts, and the degree of institutionalized support
or these activities (Landry et al., 2006). We  assessed the pro-
les of the universities in the sample based on their RAE 2008
core (university research quality) and a dummy  for group (Russell
roup, Red Brick, 1994 Group, New Universities) to account for the
trong institutional differences between groups of universities in
he UK. Larger and more prestigious universities may  afford morey 43 (2014) 1189–1203
opportunities for industry collaboration than smaller, lower status
institutions (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001).
The last group of variables measures regional economic and
innovation activity in the NUTS2 (37 UK regions) of the universities
in our sample. We  included variables for Gross Domestic Product (in
D millions) (region GDP), business R&D expenditure (in D millions)
(region R&D) and number of patent applications to the European
Patent Ofﬁce per million of inhabitants (region patents). These vari-
ables measure levels of demand for academic knowledge in the
local environment (Krabel and Mueller, 2009).
4.2. Identiﬁcation strategy
Empirical analysis of peer effects can produce spurious corre-
lations, and may  suffer from the identiﬁcation problem described
by Manski (1993). We  dealt with these methodological issues as
follows.
First, we  addressed the possibility that local sorting processes
for hiring and retaining academic staff and individual self-selection
into departments might bias results. Keen industry collaborators
might self-select into or be hired by departments with higher lev-
els of academic engagement with industry. To address this we
used information from grant records on moves between univer-
sities, extracting the researcher’s previous two afﬁliations. We
gathered information on level of industry-related activity in the
origin and destination departments of these individuals based on
funding received from industry according to RAE records. If the
move was related to industry collaboration, we would expect some
variation in the level of industry engagement between the origin
and the destination departments. However, comparing the val-
ues for each individual based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we
found no statistically signiﬁcant differences for level of income
from industry received by the department of origin and the des-
tination department (z = -1.538, Prob > |z| = 0.1241). It would seem
that researchers do not move between departments based on
the departments’ industry collaboration proﬁle, which suggests
strongly that researchers do not self-select into departments for
engagement reasons. This result holds for the subsample of ‘highly
engaged’ academics (those in the top 25% or top 10% of the academic
engagement index distribution). The data shows that academics
move based on the research quality of the university and the
department. The same test applied to the difference in research
quality between origin and destination universities and depart-
ments, shows statistically signiﬁcant differences (in both cases the
destination is of higher quality on average). These tests do not
completely exclude the possibility of a sorting effect based on the
department’s industry collaboration proﬁles. Even if we observe
no differences in the level of engagement between the individ-
ual’s origin and destination departments, we  cannot exclude that
researchers identify a desirable departmental match to industry
engagement at the start of their careers and subsequently move to
similar departments. However, our observation of the tendency to
move to departments of higher scientiﬁc quality signals that the
decision to select a speciﬁc department (or candidate) is driven
mostly by scientiﬁc productivity considerations (Bercovitz and
Feldman, 2007). This is particularly relevant in the UK context,
where universities are periodically and publicly evaluated (and
rewarded) on the basis of their scientiﬁc performance, assessed
mostly on the basis of the quality of faculty members’ scientiﬁc pub-
lications. These evaluations play a formative role in departments’
hiring practices, leading to ‘bidding wars’ for leading faculty.
Second, the peer effect we want to measure should be truly
endogenous, meaning the individual’s behaviour will vary with
the behaviour of the group to which s/he belongs. Simple observa-
tion of a correlation between individual and group behaviours may
hide other mechanisms at play. A correlation effect might be due
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o unobservable characteristics inﬂuencing the behaviours of both
he individual and his or her peers. Individuals might behave simi-
arly to the group because of their similar individual characteristics.
e  addressed this problem by including detailed information on
epartments, universities and regions. We  conducted an additional
nalysis aimed at reducing the effect of shared unobservable con-
extual characteristics on individual behaviour, following Bercovitz
nd Feldman (2008), including an independent variable outside
eers’ engagement, deﬁned as the average value of the academic
ngagement index for individuals outside the focal individual’s
eer group, that is, for departmental colleagues of different ranks.
his allows us to investigate whether the individual’s decision
o collaborate with industry is driven by unobservable depart-
ent characteristics rather than imitating peers. To take account
f ‘outside peers’, we require information on at least one additional
ndividual in the same department, but of different seniority; this
educed the number of our observations to 1192.
Third, we might be observing exogenous (contextual) effects:
ndividual behaviour might be affected by exogenous characteris-
ics - of peers (Manski, 2000). For instance, academic engagement
ight be based on the age and gender of co-workers. To control
or this possibility, we computed the average academic age of the
ocal individual’s peers (academic age peers) and included it in the
odel.
Fourth, average group behaviour might be inﬂuenced by the
ehaviour of the individual member, introducing a ‘reﬂection prob-
em’ (Manski, 1993, 2000). Manski suggests that the reﬂection
roblem can be alleviated by examining peer effects on the basis
f attitudes and perceptions rather than manifested behaviours:
his makes it easier to differentiate between preferences interaction
nd expectations interaction (Manski, 1993, 2000). We  performed
n analysis using a perception variable measuring the extent of
he beneﬁts of academic engagement perceived by the individual’s
eers. We  operationalized the extent of the perceived beneﬁts from
ndustry collaboration as the total number of single beneﬁts indi-
ated by the individual as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ in the
uestionnaire (items reported in Appendix). The list of beneﬁts
uilds on D’Este and Patel (2007) and refers to both personal and
rofessional beneﬁts from working with industry. This information
llowed us to construct a peers’ beneﬁts measure based on the aver-
ge number of beneﬁts perceived by the individual’s departmental
eers (excluding the focal individual). Subjective evaluation of the
eneﬁts of industry engagement helps to mitigate some of the mea-
urement issues associated with the reﬂection problem (Manski,
993). Manski (2000) states that, so far, ‘the practice has been to
nfer interaction processes from observations of their outcomes.
. . .]  Experimental and subjective data will have to play important
oles in future efforts to learn about social interactions’.
We  address the issue of reﬂection by isolating the behaviour
f recently recruited academics. Sorensen (2006) in an analysis of
ocial learning and health plan choices assumes that the health plan
hoices of newly hired employees are inﬂuenced by co-workers, but
ot vice versa. Our data allowed us to perform an analysis making
 similar assumption. Among the individuals in our sample, 523
ad responded to the 2004 survey, which allowed us to identify
ndividuals (52) who had moved universities between 2004 and
009. They were labelled movers and assumed to be inﬂuenced by
he behaviour of their new colleagues, but not vice versa since the
bservation period was too short for the reﬂection mechanism to
ave occurred.
.3. EstimationWe  employed an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to
nvestigate the impact of peers’ behaviour on individual indus-
ry collaboration. Use of OLS assumes a normally distributedy 43 (2014) 1189–1203 1195
dependent variable: therefore, we  employ the natural logarithm
of the academic engagement index. To address possible het-
eroschedasticity problems, we  use robust standard errors. Another
assumption of OLS is that standard errors are independently and
identically distributed; however, this can be violated. If the errors
are clustered (i.e. if the observations within a certain group are
correlated in unobservable ways), the OLS estimates will be unbi-
ased, but the standard errors may  be wrong, leading to incorrect
inferences. Since the respondents in our sample are afﬁliated to
different disciplines, we can expect some group correlation which
we are not able to observe; therefore, we  clustered errors by scien-
tiﬁc discipline. As a robustness check, we clustered errors also by
department and university; the main results were unchanged.
5. Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics and correlations
for all the variables employed. Correlations are generally low to
moderate indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in the
estimations. The variance inﬂation factor for the main speciﬁcation
is 2.4, which is well below the value of 10 commonly recognized as
indicating multicollinearity. The appropriateness of using weights
for the academic engagement index can be gauged from the pat-
tern of academics’ engagement across different disciplines. Some
activities are more common than others. For example, nearly 83%
of respondents attended conferences with industry participation
while only 17% were involved in the creation of physical facilities,
such as laboratories, with industry partners. Eight percent of our
sample had not engaged in any form of industry collaboration, and
a small proportion of individuals did not perceive any important
beneﬁts from industry engagement. Additional research funding
was seen as the most important driver for industry collaboration.
Table 5 presents the results of our econometric analyses.
Model (1) is the baseline model in which the dependent vari-
able is academic engagement. Academic age has a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant effect on the level of engagement with
industry. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) observed that a longer time
since completion of formal training reduced the likelihood of the
researcher collaborating with industry because, in the past, engage-
ment with industry was less relevant or even discouraged. Being
a professor (academic rank = 1) has a positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant effect: this ﬁnding is in line with previous research (Link
et al., 2007) and suggests that more experienced academics com-
mand more organizational resources and have more freedom to
engage in proactive behaviours such as collaboration with indus-
try. Experience of working in the private sector (industry experience)
is positive and signiﬁcant, which is in line with previous research
(Audretsch, 1998). Intrinsic motivation to become an academic is
positively and signiﬁcantly related to industry engagement, which
perhaps indicates that academics who  adhere to the norms of public
science collaborate with industry in order to advance their research
agendas (D’Este and Perkmann, 2011). Academics who graduated
from a UK university are signiﬁcantly more likely to engage with
industry than those trained abroad, but a PhD degree from a high-
status university (elite PhD) seems not to have an effect. Being a
high-performing scientist (star) is not signiﬁcant in the regression,
suggesting that the positive and signiﬁcant correlation between
research productivity and both academic engagement and com-
mercialization found in previous studies of life scientists (Zucker
and Darby, 1996) may  not hold for physical and engineering scien-
tists. Analysing individuals’ scientiﬁc productivity in more depth
we ﬁnd that the effect of the amount of EPSRC grant funding
received on industry engagement is not statistically signiﬁcant,
while number of publications is positively and signiﬁcantly cor-
related with industry collaboration, which is in line with previous
1196 V. Tartari et al. / Research Policy 43 (2014) 1189–1203
Table  3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
Individual engagement 1371 4.43 4.43 0 33.01
Gender 1371 0.11 0.31 0 1
Academic age 1371 21.07 9.87 1 60
Academic rank 1371 0.54 0.50 0 1
Industry experience 1371 2.77 5.26 0 45
Star  scientist 1371 0.08 0.31 0 3
Intrinsic motivation 1371 3.35 0.80 0 4
British PhD 1371 0.84 0.37 0 1
Elite  PhD 1371 0.42 0.49 0 1
Individual grants 1371 1.00 2.04 0 27.28
Publications 1371 25.03 27.04 0 393
Basic  discipline 1371 0.39 0.49 0 1
Russell Group 1371 0.62 0.49 0 1
Red  Brick Universities 1371 0.18 0.38 0 1
Group 1994 Universities 1371 0.19 0.40 0 1
New  Universities 1371 0.03 0.16 0 1
Department industry funds (per employee) 1371 179,925 125,988 3416 993,625
Dept.  research quality 1371 0.63 0.15 0.11 0.95
University patents (per employee) 1371 0.25 0.30 0 1.24
University industry funds (per employee) 1371 24.08 23.69 1.15 142.81
Univ. research quality 1371 2.68 0.19 1.75 2.98
Region GDP (Million Euro) 1371 73,013 55,214 17,117 193,752
Region R&D (by GDP) 1371 1.78 0.97 0.93 4.29
Region patents (per million inhabitants) 1371 77 58 0.07 199
Peers’ engagement 1371 4.48 3.24 0 33.01
4.4
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esearch on academic inventors (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002;
zoulay et al., 2007; Breschi et al., 2007; Fabrizio and Di Minin,
008). Working within a basic discipline has a negative and signif-
cant effect on engagement, which conﬁrms previous results (Link
t al., 2007). None of the department level variables has a signiﬁcant
ffect. University quality is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated
ith engagement: better universities receive more government
unding and more funding from a wider range of other sources and,
herefore, are less reliant on industry to ﬁnance research projects.
one of the regional level variables is signiﬁcant in the regression.
Model (2) builds on the previous base model speciﬁcation, but
ncludes peers’ engagement, the variable measuring the level of
ngagement of the individual’s departmental peers. The explana-
ory power of the model is signiﬁcantly strengthened with the
ddition of the main independent variable: R2 increases from 0.193
o 0.239. The inﬂuence of the peers’ engagement with industry is
ositive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that the collaboration activi-
ies of an academic mirror the behaviour of his/her departmental
olleagues of the same rank, as predicted by H1. All the control
ariables show the same effect as in the baseline model.
In Model (3) we introduce the ﬁrst moderator, academic age,
hich again improves the model’s explanatory power. The interac-
ion term is signiﬁcant and negative: Younger individuals rely more
eavily than their senior colleagues on social comparison with their
eers when deciding on engagement with industry, which conﬁrms
2. In Model (4), we test H3 by including the second moderator,
tar scientist. As expected, the interaction term between star scien-
ist and peers’ engagement is negative and signiﬁcant: high-status
ndividuals compare themselves less with their departmental peers
nd therefore are less locally conformist. Again, the change in R2 is
ositive and signiﬁcant although the coefﬁcient of the interaction
erm is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. Finally, in Model (5), we
est the full model. The signs are consistent with the previous spec-
ﬁcations, and we observe a statistically signiﬁcant increase in R2.
s a robustness check, we calculated an alternative speciﬁcation
f the main model that included university dummies and region
ummies instead of the university and regional variables; the main
esults did not change.2 3.12 0 33.01
82 8.91 0 49
8 2.70 0 15
Table 6 presents the analysis testing for possible sources of spu-
rious correlation. Model (1) reproduces the main model testing the
inﬂuence of peers’ behaviours on individual behaviours as a refer-
ence. To check for unobserved heterogeneity, which might explain
the correlation between behaviours for other reasons than peer
imitation, in Model (2), along with the main independent vari-
able, we  introduce an additional variable measuring outside peers’
engagement. In this speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcients of the main inde-
pendent variable and the controls remain unchanged, while the
coefﬁcient of outside peers’ engagement is not signiﬁcant. ‘Outside
peers’ comprises all individuals within a department of different
rank to the focal individual. This suggests our results are driven by
the identiﬁed peer effects and not by some characteristics of the
department we  could not control for.
To rule out the possibility of contextual (exogenous) effects
in the analysis, in Model (3) we  introduce the average academic
age of the focal individual’s peers. As expected, the coefﬁcient of
peers’ academic age is not signiﬁcant: individual decisions related to
industry engagement activities are not inﬂuenced by a key exoge-
nous characteristic of the individual’s co-workers.
Models (4) and (5) address the problem of reﬂection. Follow-
ing Manski’s (1993, 2000) suggestion we test the effect of peers’
perceptions of the beneﬁts deriving from academic engagement (as
opposed to manifest behaviours) on the focal individual’s engage-
ment. We  ﬁnd the effect of peers’ perception of the beneﬁts on
individual engagement is positive and signiﬁcant. An individual’s
behaviour is driven not only by what peers do but also by what they
believe. Beliefs tend to be more stable than behaviours and, hence,
individuals will be less likely to be affected by others’ behaviours.
This ﬁnding provides additional evidence of the presence of gen-
uine peer effects because it makes it less likely that our ﬁndings
are afﬂicted by reverse causality in the sense that peers could be
inﬂuenced by the focal individual’s behaviour.
Model (5) is a standard analysis of the subsample of researchers
who moved universities between 2004 and 2009. The coefﬁcient
associated with peers’ behaviour is signiﬁcant and positive, provid-
ing additional support for the argument that individual behaviour
is shaped by peers’ behaviour and not vice versa, assuming that
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Table 4
Correlation matrix.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
[1] Gender 1
[2]  Academic age −0.1453 1
[3] Academic rank −0.1175 0.4923 1
[4] Industry experience −0.0667 0.1722 0.0684 1
[5]  Star scientist −0.0165 0.0961 0.2280 0.0551 1
[6]  Intrinsic motivation 0.0963 −0.0041 0.0497 −0.0792 0.0259 1
[7]  British PhD −0.0545 0.1551 0.0515 0.0860 0.0660 −0.0076 1
[8]  Elite PhD −0.0212 0.0451 0.0381 0.0015 0.0815 0.0351 0.1420 1
[9]  Individual grants −0.0512 0.1459 0.1986 0.0532 0.3587 −0.0198 0.0981 0.0742 1
[10]  Publications −0.0509 0.1826 0.2918 −0.0019 0.4014 0.0487 0.0528 0.0756 0.1566 1
[11]  Basic discipline −0.0064 0.0566 0.0404 −0.1075 −0.0385 0.0133 −0.0506 0.1288 −0.0121 0.1340 1
[12]  Russell Group 0.0016 0.0278 0.0431 −0.0855 0.1302 0.0717 0.0038 0.1904 0.0707 0.1305 0.0854 1
[13]  Red Brick Universities −0.0444 0.0114 −0.0389 −0.0329 0.0346 0.0277 0.0595 0.0055 −0.0205 0.0081 0.0094 0.3527 1
[14]  Group 1994 −0.0427 0.0006 −0.0241 0.0491 −0.0866 −0.0360 −0.0131 −0.0752 −0.0561 −0.0417 0.0500 −0.6605 −0.2329
[15]  New Universities 0.0103 −0.0205 −0.0008 0.0261 −0.0045 0.0178 0.0592 −0.0300 −0.0232 −0.0415 −0.0927 −0.1783 −0.0629
[16]  Dept. industry funds −0.0436 0.0738 0.0699 0.0381 0.0456 0.0737 0.0334 0.0627 0.0912 0.2291 0.2435 0.2523 0.0946
[17]  Dept. research quality −0.0140 −0.0046 0.0047 0.0255 0.1488 0.0098 0.0162 0.1600 0.0967 0.0655 −0.1982 0.4554 0.1171
[18]  Univ. Patents 0.0494 −0.0249 −0.0221 −0.0050 0.0511 0.0034 −0.0477 0.1063 0.0246 0.0193 −0.0021 0.2429 −0.2152
[19]  Univ. industry funds 0.0436 0.0080 0.0095 0.0821 0.0194 −0.0544 0.0273 0.0341 0.0412 −0.0190 −0.1202 −0.0385 −0.1533
[20]  Univ. research quality −0.0172 0.0370 0.0135 −0.0530 0.1044 0.0511 −0.0260 0.2904 0.0509 0.1332 0.1395 0.5981 0.0111
[21]  Region GDP 0.1017 −0.0258 −0.0046 −0.0373 0.0319 0.0516 −0.0495 0.1399 0.0043 −0.0376 0.0534 0.1838 −0.2235
[22]  Region R&D −0.0132 0.0259 0.0214 0.0487 0.0456 −0.0159 0.0278 0.0908 0.0606 0.0895 −0.0594 −0.0578 −0.1956
[23]  Region patents 0.0329 0.0290 0.0152 −0.0398 0.0737 0.0486 −0.0055 0.2331 0.0401 0.1024 0.1123 0.2667 −0.2312
[24]  Peers’ engagement 0.0023 0.0720 0.2289 0.1071 0.0780 −0.0016 0.0900 −0.0478 0.0778 0.1072 −0.2465 −0.0584 −0.0113
[25]  Outside peers’ engagement 0.0057 −0.0665 −0.2668 0.0785 −0.0266 0.0053 0.0644 −0.0697 −0.0472 −0.0652 −0.2374 −0.1278 −0.0403
[26]  Peers’ academic age −0.1007 0.4313 0.6458 0.0250 0.1815 0.0611 0.0634 0.0173 0.1259 0.2192 0.0386 0.0435 0.0169
[14]  [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26]
[1] Gender
[2] Academic age
[3] Academic rank
[4] Industry experience
[5] Star scientist
[6] Intrinsic motivation
[7] British PhD
[8] Elite PhD
[9] Individual grants
[10] Publications
[11] Basic discipline
[12] Russell Group
[13] Red Brick Universities
[14] Group 1994 1
[15] New Universities −0.0675 1
[16] Dept. industry funds −0.1082 −0.0825 1
[17] Dept. research quality −0.1554 −0.2174 0.1504 1
[18] Univ. Patents −0.2522 −0.0264 0.1381 0.1755 1
[19] Univ. industry funds −0.1160 −0.0538 0.0714 0.0703 0.4851 1
[20] Univ. research quality −0.0937 −0.4209 0.2357 0.6119 0.3151 0.0548 1
[21]  Region GDP −0.1325 −0.0250 0.0452 0.0794 0.6222 0.2503 0.3242 1
[22]  Region R&D 0.0451 −0.0475 −0.0083 0.1536 −0.1874 0.3078 0.1816 −0.2383 1
[23]  Region patents 0.0008 −0.0623 0.0481 0.3060 0.1936 0.0507 0.5988 0.4232 0.4818 1
[24]  Peers’ engagement −0.0226 −0.0048 0.0954 0.0469 0.0392 0.2276 −0.0812 −0.0487 0.0734 −0.0873 1
[25]  Outside peers’ engagement −0.0103 0.0777 0.0497 −0.0258 0.0665 0.2111 −0.1212 −0.0111 0.0212 −0.1014 0.1434 1
[26]  Peers’ academic age −0.0312 0.0256 0.0527 −0.0422 −0.0484 −0.0075 0.0114 −0.0021 0.0059 0.0609 0.0875 −0.0929 1
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Table  5
Regression results for individual academic engagement. Dependent variable: Academic engagement index.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender −0.0331 −0.0466 −0.0375 −0.0478 −0.0388
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043)
Academic age −0.0072** −0.0061* −0.0059* −0.0062* −0.0059**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Academic rank 0.2377*** 0.1496*** 0.1431*** 0.1479*** 0.1416***
(0.042) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Industry experience 0.0240*** 0.0229*** 0.0232*** 0.0229*** 0.0231***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Star  scientist −0.0952 −0.0761 −0.0738 −0.0621 −0.0609
(0.091) (0.090) (0.092) (0.100) (0.100)
Intrinsic motivation 0.0952** 0.0916** 0.0915** 0.0918** 0.0917**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
British  PhD 0.2172** 0.1899* 0.1847* 0.1894* 0.1843*
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Elite  PhD −0.0736 −0.0716+ −0.0690+ −0.0721+ −0.0695+
(0.048) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Individual grants 0.0123 0.0105 0.0102 0.0113 0.0110
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Publications 0.0033* 0.0029* 0.0028* 0.0029* 0.0029*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Basic  discipline −0.3202* −0.2404* −0.2417* −0.2413* −0.2425*
(0.134) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099)
Dept.  industry funds (per employee) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dept.  research quality 0.1310 0.0652 0.0698 0.0593 0.0643
(0.273) (0.182) (0.180) (0.179) (0.178)
University patents 0.0392 0.0465 0.0398 0.0501 0.0433
(0.126) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107)
Univ.  industry funds (per employee) 0.0036* 0.0021+ 0.0022+ 0.0021+ 0.0022+
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Univ.  research quality −0.4514+ −0.3662* −0.3817* −0.3662* −0.3813*
(0.233) (0.163) (0.158) (0.160) (0.156)
Region  GDP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Region  R&D 0.0188 0.0213 0.0196 0.0203 0.0187
(0.050) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Region  patents −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Peers’  engagement 0.1811*** 0.3021*** 0.1893*** 0.3075***
(0.034) (0.049) (0.033) (0.048)
Academic age × peers’ engagement −0.0055** −0.0054**
(0.002) (0.002)
Star  scientist × peers’ engagement −0.0891+ −0.0820+
(0.043) (0.045)
Constant 1.8182** 1.7130*** 1.7552*** 1.7163*** 1.7575***
(0.513) (0.360) (0.349) (0.357) (0.346)
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
R-squared 0.193 0.239 0.244 0.240 0.245
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares, robust standard errors clustered by discipline. University groups included.
Two-tailed tests.
+ p < 0.10.
* p < 0.05.
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ecent movers are more likely to be inﬂuenced by their colleagues
nd that the time frame is too short for the mean behaviour of the
roup to be inﬂuenced by these new colleagues.
In order to control for the possibility that these effects are
enerated by social comparison with peers and not by a hier-
rchical imposition of policy, we control for whether junior
esearchers’ engagement with industry behaviour is inﬂuenced by
he engagement of the senior departmental colleagues. In Table 6
e estimate a similar model to Model (2) for the subsample of
unior researchers: in this case, the coefﬁcient of the variable
outside peers’ behaviour’ should show the effect of more senior
olleagues’ behaviour on junior researchers’ behaviour. We  found
o effect. This would suggest that junior researchers are not sig-
iﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the behaviour of senior colleagues, but are
igniﬁcantly inﬂuenced by colleagues of the same rank.To explore whether peer effects differ across different kinds of
industry engagement, we computed the main regression model
using the four broad types of engagement as the dependent vari-
ables (see results in Table 7). While we observe a decrease in the
signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients and in the R2 due to a decrease in the
likelihood of observing a speciﬁc behaviour, the results are virtually
unchanged. It seems, therefore, that social comparison mechanisms
apply across the whole range of collaboration activities. To account
for the possibility that the four regressions are not independent of
each other and that the residuals might be correlated, we  computed
them using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model which
allows the error terms in the four regressions to be correlated with
each other. The results do not change.
While similar versions of our dependent variable have been pre-
viously used (Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007; Aschhoff and Grimpe,
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Table  6
Regression results for tests for the identiﬁcation problems. Dependent variable: Academic engagement index.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender −0.0466 −0.0548 −0.0459 −0.0546 −0.0316
(0.042) (0.039) (0.043) (0.041) (0.332)
Academic age −0.0061* −0.0054* −0.0062* −0.0064** 0.0229
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018)
Academic rank 0.1496*** 0.1572*** 0.1418** 0.1607*** −0.1271
(0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.355)
Industry experience 0.0229*** 0.0200*** 0.0230*** 0.0226*** 0.0039
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.028)
Star  scientist −0.0761 −0.0799 −0.0767 −0.0695 0.1788
(0.090) (0.087) (0.090) (0.089) (0.357)
Intrinsic motivation 0.0916** 0.0904** 0.0913** 0.0858** 0.1386
(0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.155)
British  PhD 0.1899* 0.1793* 0.1897* 0.1856* 0.1833
(0.069) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.258)
Elite  PhD −0.0716+ −0.0473 −0.0714+ −0.0669 0.2099
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.254)
Individual grants 0.0105 0.0088 0.0106 0.0115 0.0056
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.102)
Publications 0.0029* 0.0027* 0.0029* 0.0029* −0.0040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Basic  discipline −0.2404* −0.2263* −0.2403* −0.2160* −0.3643
(0.097) (0.088) (0.097) (0.088) (0.234)
Dpt.  industry funds (per employee) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dept.  research quality 0.0652 −0.0621 0.0674 0.0944 −0.8755
(0.182) (0.174) (0.183) (0.168) (0.914)
University patents 0.0465 0.0599 0.0479 0.0398 −0.0961
(0.107) (0.111) (0.108) (0.108) (0.830)
Univ.  industry funds (per employee) 0.0021+ 0.0018 0.0021+ 0.0024+ −0.0040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018)
Univ.  research quality −0.3662* −0.3840* −0.3668* −0.3156+ −0.4412
(0.163) (0.136) (0.164) (0.164) (1.430)
Region  GDP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Region  R&D 0.0213 0.0139 0.0222 0.0197 0.3817
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.293)
Region  patents −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0078
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Peers’  engagement 0.1811*** 0.1916*** 0.1815*** 0.1521*** 0.4076+
(0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.205)
Outside peers’ engagement 0.0389
(0.028)
Peers’ academic age 0.0008
(0.002)
Peers’ perception of beneﬁts 0.0237*
(0.008)
Constant 1.7130*** 1.8492*** 1.7047*** 1.4344** 1.0480
(0.360) (0.277) (0.352) (0.382) (3.299)
Observations 1371 1213 1371 1371 52
R-squared 0.239 0.236 0.239 0.244 0.638
Notes: Ordinary Least Square, robust standard errors clustered by discipline. Model (5) robust standard errors. University groups included. Two-tailed tests.
+ p < 0.10.
2
c
m
e
t
d
a
a
o
b
t
g
a
a
i* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
014), there may  be concerns about its validity. Provided that its
omponents are self-reported by academics, and we use an index
ethod to aggregate them, one may  question whether the depend-
nt variable effectively captures what it is supposed to represent,
hat is the extent of academics’ industry engagement. It remains
ifﬁcult to collect objective information about the entire range of
cademics engagement efforts. For instance, we lack reliable patent
nd co-authorship data for all the individuals in our sample. In
rder to assess the validity of the DV, we computed the correlation
etween the academic engagement index value and two  objec-
ive measures of engagement with industry: the amount of EPSRC
rants received by an academic that included an industry partner,
nd the share of an academic’s research budget funded by industry
s self-reported in the questionnaire. Overall, the correlation of our
ndex value with these two indicators is positive and signiﬁcant.The correlation between the index value and EPSRC grants with
industry participation is 0.2 and the correlation between the index
value and academic’ research budget from industry is 0.5. While the
value of the ﬁrst correlation is relatively low, this may  be because
EPSRC grants with industry participation are just one way in which
academics engage with industry; direct funding from industrial
partners is unaccounted for by this method. In turn, since the
measure is a composite of many different forms of engagement is
unlikely to be directly correlated with any single objective measure
of academic engagement. Yet, the degree of correlation between
these two  variables suggested that AEI has a reasonable overlap
with more objective measures. Greater measurement effort will be
required in the future to map  more accurately academics engage-
ment in different collaboration channels rather than simply relying
on self-reported levels of engagement.
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Table  7
Dependent variable splits. This table reports results separately for four broad types of engagement (see Table 1).
Variables (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (3A) (3B) (4A) (4B)
Joint research Research services Training collaboration Networking
Academic age −0.0046* −0.0045* −0.0053+ −0.0051* −0.0046+ −0.0046+ −0.0059** −0.0059**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry experience 0.0136** 0.0135** 0.0284*** 0.0287*** 0.0115* 0.0116* 0.0121* 0.0121*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Star  scientist −0.0519 −0.0508 −0.0437 −0.0336 −0.0900 −0.0860 −0.0241 −0.0271
(0.080)  (0.077) (0.071) (0.075) (0.112) (0.114) (0.071) (0.076)
Peers’  behaviour 0.1006** 0.1777*** 0.1489*** 0.2728*** 0.1434*** 0.2585*** 0.1507** 0.1457+
(0.029) (0.035) (0.021) (0.041) (0.030) (0.053) (0.037) (0.080)
Peers’  behaviour × academic age −0.0034* −0.0051** −0.0054* 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Peers’  behaviour × star scientist 0.0231 −0.0671 −0.0411 0.0120
(0.072) (0.061) (0.068) (0.064)
Outside peers’ behaviour
Constant 1.2237* 1.2552* 0.8711 0.8673 0.7502 0.7582 1.4565*** 1.4534***
(0.483) (0.482) (0.571) (0.565) (0.504) (0.490) (0.250) (0.252)
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
R-squared 0.133 0.135 0.208 0.213 0.136 0.141 0.127 0.127
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares, robust standard errors clustered by discipline. Control variables included.
For each regression, Peers’ behaviour includes the same items included in the dependent variable.
Two-tailed tests.
+ p < 0.10.
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As a ﬁnal robustness check, we explore the characteristics of the
esearchers who were dropped from the analysis because of lack of
nformation on their peer groups. By construction, we expect that
esearchers from smaller universities and smaller departments will
e more likely to be excluded from the analysis since the likeli-
ood of multiple observations from those institutions is smaller
han in the case of researchers afﬁliated to larger universities and
epartments. We  found evidence that researchers from large uni-
ersities and large departments were oversampled in the ﬁnal
egression compared to the distribution in the original sample of
cademics who responded to the questions about industry engage-
ent activities (1895). We  estimated a logistic regression to obtain
he probability of being included in the regression as a function of
he size of the department and university of afﬁliation. We  used the
nverse of this probability as a weight in the estimation of our main
odel; the results were unchanged.
. Discussion
Our analysis suggests that academics’ engagement with indus-
ry is informed by the behaviour of their departmental peers.
bserving colleagues’ behaviours appears to exert pressure on indi-
iduals to emulate such behaviour. We  postulated that the cause of
his ﬁnding is the mechanism of social comparison which allows
ndividuals to derive self-worth by comparing themselves with
imilar others and competing with them for professional status
nd achievement. This reasoning is strengthened by the ﬁnding
hat peer inﬂuence is weaker for individuals who are more senior
nd for higher-performing individuals. Junior scientists are more
ikely to be inﬂuenced by local peers when deciding whether to
ngage with industry because for this group, local peers are a more
alient reference group in relation to self-evaluation and academic
chievement in a competitive context. In turn, compared to lower
erformers, star performers are less inﬂuenced by local peers as
hey may  look further a ﬁeld for reference points when competing
rofessionally. However, we found only modest support for this
atter ﬁnding; the coefﬁcient shows modest statistical signiﬁcance.Our study makes several contributions. First, we add to the
work on university–industry relations and commercialization of
university technologies. Researchers have long been interested in
what drives academic scientists to work with industry, thereby
facilitating the transfer of knowledge and technology from univer-
sities to industry (Louis et al., 1989; Mansﬁeld, 1995; Owen-Smith
and Powell, 2001; Murray, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003; Haeussler
and Colyvas, 2011). There is a strand in the literature that high-
lights individual behaviour as being strongly informed by the
social context of the university or department (Stuart and Ding,
2006; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). Our study contributes to
this line of work by pointing to a mechanism that promotes this
local context inﬂuence. When deciding to engage proactively with
industry–which effectively is discretionary behaviour–academic
scientists mimic  the average behaviour of departmental work col-
leagues at a similar stage in their careers. We  suggest that this effect
is produced by social comparison, meaning that scientists com-
pare themselves with relevant others who are their departmental
peers. Social comparison suggests an element of rivalry and com-
petition motivating scientists’ industry engagement strategies. In
other words, academic scientists may  decide to engage with indus-
try in order to match the performance levels of their colleagues,
and to improve their career prospects. While previous research has
explored various facets of competition in academia, such as the
race for priority in publishing (Hagstrom, 1974) and the struggle
for resources (Merton, 1968), our ﬁndings suggest that competi-
tion may  also be a motivation for academic scientists’ proactive
efforts to collaborate with industrial users of their research. The
link between industry engagement and academic career progress
suggests that industry engagement may  be more closely aligned
with an academic’s professional progress in the world of science
than is suggested by studies that view collaboration with indus-
try as a distinct from the universities’ other missions (Etzkowitz,
2003).
Our study also provides a broader view of academic engage-
ment with industry than academic entrepreneurship, which is
often regarded as the most visible and impactful mode of scien-
tists’ interaction with the private sector. Much of the research
on university–industry relations highlights the incidence and
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mpact of academic scientists’ entrepreneurial activities in the
orm of patent applications and the founding of academic spin-
ffs (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Shane, 2002). While patents
nd licensing are certainly important means of technology trans-
er, they account for only part of the information transferred from
niversities (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). Our academic engage-
ent index allowed us to capture more frequent collaboration
ehaviours than the types explored in other studies. In many
isciplines, large numbers of academic faculty routinely partici-
ate in collaborative engagement with industry via joint research,
onsulting, or contract research (Louis et al., 1989; Gulbrandsen
nd Smeby, 2005; D’Este and Patel, 2007). Characterizing these as
ngagement behaviours allows us to account for the fact that aca-
emics may  exploit them for reasons other than entrepreneurship.
hese reasons can include mobilizing resources for their academic
esearch projects, and sources for new ideas that may  shape their
uture research agendas (Rosenberg, 1982; Mansﬁeld, 1995). The
ovel insight that we bring to this body of scholarship is that
ngagement with industry may  be fuelled by an individual’s desire
o compete effectively in the academic profession. By implication,
ur results tentatively suggest that at the department level, indus-
ry engagement appears to be a function of the group dynamics and
ndividuals’ responses to it, rather than a response to a departmen-
al top-down imposition of rules and norms as suggested by prior
tudies. However, the incidence of peer effects in our study does
ot categorically exclude the presence of other effects. Indeed, it
s not possible for us to rule out effects related to social learning
mong peers in addition to social comparison.
Our study also contributes to the literature by attempting
o overcome the problems related to testing claims about the
nﬂuence of peers. First, we use a large, comprehensive dataset
haracterizing the activities of individuals and their peers. This
ncludes academic researchers active in a wide range of disciplines
nd universities and goes beyond the focus in the literature on the
ole of social context related to life-sciences. Second, we  explore the
eterminants of a range of industry collaboration including con-
ulting, contract research, joint research and training of company
mployees. This allows us to develop insights that are applicable
o widely practised activities rather than relatively rare activities,
uch as entrepreneurship. Third, in testing peer effects, we  address
he problem that the correlation between peers’ behaviour and
ndividual engagement with industry may  be spurious and afﬂicted
y identiﬁcation problems - a problem common to all studies of
roup effects on individual behaviour (Manski, 1993). On the one
and, we seek to exclude the possibility of the presence of contex-
ual interactions by showing that individual behaviours do not vary
ith exogenous characteristics of the group members. On the other
and, we separate the impact of social effects from the inﬂuence
f common unobservable characteristics by including rich informa-
ion on the environment in which these academics operate. We  also
istinguish between different groups of colleagues, following the
dea proposal in Munshi and Myaux (2006) and Sorensen (2006),
ccording to which estimated peer effects should be stronger when
he social group is deﬁned more narrowly. Finally, we attempt
o address the reﬂection problem. Previous work predominantly
ocuses on manifested behaviours in attempting to establish the
mpact of local social contexts (Louis et al., 1989; Sorensen, 2006;
tuart and Ding, 2006; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Nanda and
orensen, 2010). Our approach moves in the direction of Manski’s
2000) suggestion and adds to these works by considering the sep-
rate impacts of peers’ perceptions and behaviours on individual
ctions.Finally, our results also have implications for the study of profes-
ional services organizations because, in many respects, academic
epartments have features in common with practice areas in these
rganizations. Universities, like other professional services ﬁrms,y 43 (2014) 1189–1203 1201
are professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1983) where highly
skilled individuals work relatively autonomously with groups and
‘clients’ external to their organizations. For all these organiza-
tions, employees’ discretionary behaviours are crucial for acquiring
external resources and ‘getting the job done’. Our study suggests
that individual behaviour is shaped to a great extent by peers in
the immediate work environment. Comparing oneself with peers
appears to have a major inﬂuence on the individual’s decision
to engage in behaviour that is not unequivocally prescribed by
organizational policies. In this context, note that ‘outside peers’,
i.e. local colleagues who are either more junior or more senior
than the focal individual, do not appear to inform individual’s
behaviour. This suggests that individuals are strongly oriented
towards what they perceive to be their generalized other, sug-
gesting that immediate peer groups represent opportunities for
generating professional identities which in turn inform individuals’
attitudes and behaviours (Ibarra, 1999).
7. Implications, limitations and future research
Understanding the social mechanisms that lead academics to
engage with industry contributes to the wider issue related to how
universities and organizations in general, should be managed, and
speciﬁcally with respect to the promotion of proactive behaviour by
organization members. Our ﬁndings suggest that direct incentives
offered by senior members, such as heads of university depart-
ments, to encourage employees to behave proactively in relation to
seeking engagement with industrial partners may be only partially
effective. Similar to what happens when we observe the tension
between bureaucracy and entrepreneurship (Ruef and Lounsbury,
2007), proactive behaviours are hard to incentivize or dictate.
Because organizational members are inﬂuenced by colleagues of
the same rank, attempts to promote (or discourage) engagement
should include collective inﬂuence on organizational members
which will stimulate emulation by peers and result in a virtual cycle
of mutual reinforcement. A cultural approach to framing indus-
try engagement positively, and emphasizing its complementarities
with academic work more generally, would appear appropriate
to nurture the former aspect, while greater transparency would
enable individuals to view their colleagues’ behaviour and pro-
mote emulation. Hiring policies need to take account of the fact
that employing faculty with experience of working with industry
may increase the likelihood that departmental colleagues of the
same rank will mimic  this behaviour.
This study has some limitations, which suggest directions for
future research. First, we  rely on survey data to construct the activ-
ities not only of the focal individuals but also of the members of their
department of afﬁliation. While we possess information on a large
number of researchers, we  cannot ensure complete representative-
ness of departments. Future research should rely on universities’
archival data in order to construct precise measures of depart-
ments’ engagement activities with industry. Similar to other work
on peer effects, despite all the measures taken, our study may still
suffer from sorting bias. Future research could exploit career history
data in order to assess whether academics are sorted into depart-
ments because of their preference for engagement activities, and
could exploit panel data to analyse the dynamics of departmental
peers’ behaviour when a new faculty member joins the group.
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Researchers’ motivations for engaging with industry.
Motivation % of respondentsa
Source of additional research income 69.7
Increasing the likelihood of application of my
research outside academia
66.6
Raising awareness of problems that industry
confronts
59.3
Building and sustaining your professional
network
53.0
Keeping abreast of research conducted in
industry
51.9
Getting inspiration for new research projects 50.8
Feedback from industry about viability of
research
46.1
Access to materials or data necessary for
research
40.1
Training of postgraduate students 34.5
Helping students to ﬁnd employment in
industry
33.6
Access to research expertise of industry
employees
30.0
Improving the understanding of foundations of
particular phenomena
24.4
Access to state-of-the art equipment, facilities
and instruments
18.4
Seeking proprietary knowledge (e.g. patents) 12.3
Source of personal income 10.8
a Percentage of respondents indicating ‘very important’ or ‘crucial’ when respon-
ing to the question: how frequently have you been engaged in the following types
f  activity with industry in the last two years (calendar years 2007 and 2008)?
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